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Thesis title: “Internationalism In The Barrios: Hispanic-Americans and The Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939.”

Thesis abstract:

The ripples of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) had a far-reaching effect that touched Spanish speaking people outside of Spain. In the United States, Hispanic communities –which encompassed Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Mexicans, Spaniards, and others— were directly involved in anti-isolationist activities during the Spanish Civil War. Hispanics mobilized efforts to aid the Spanish Loyalists, they held demonstrations against the German and Italian intervention, they lobbied the United States government to lift the arms embargo on Spain, and some traveled to Spain to fight in the International Brigades.

This thesis examines how the Spanish Civil War affected the diverse Hispanic communities of Tampa, New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. Against the backdrop of the war, this paper deals with issues regarding ethnicity, class, gender, and identity. It discusses racism towards Hispanics during the early days of labor activism. It examines ways in which labor unions used the conflict in Spain to rally support from their members to raise funds for relief aid. It looks at how Hispanics fought against American isolationism in the face of the growing threat of fascism abroad.

CHAPTER 3.

THE MEXICAN-AMERICAN PRESS AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR

During the Spanish Civil War, the Mexican-American press in the Southwest stood apart from their Spanish language counterparts on the East Coast. Unlike the Tampa based *La Gaceta* or New York's *La Prensa* and *La Voz*, the Mexican exiled press was much more conservative and church-oriented. During the Spanish conflict, the Mexican expatriated press overwhelmingly leaned in favor of the Spanish Nationalists and was critical of Mexico's involvement in the Spanish Civil War. The circumstances surrounding the stark difference between the Mexican exiled press and other Spanish language immigrant publications in the Eastern Seaboard are derived from the aftermath of the Mexican Revolution of 1910.

In the years leading to the Mexican Revolution, the Mexican expatriated press in the United States was a liberal institution enmeshed in revolutionary ideas. During the regime of Mexican President Porfirio Díaz, the open border between the U.S. and Mexico allowed the revolutionary press to seek refuge in the relative safety of the United States. Liberal writers and editors that were forced into exile for their opposition to the Díaz regime resettle and published in the Mexican-American communities north of the border. Between 1885 and 1910, several Mexican publications were launched in the American Southwest and smuggled into Mexico. Such publications included Adolfo Carrillo's *La República* in San Francisco, General Ignacio

Martinez's *El Mundo* in Brownsville, Paulino Martinez's *El Monitor Democrático* in San Antonio, *La Voz de Juarez* and *El Chinaco* in Laredo.¹

However, the most prominent and radical publication was *Regeneración* by Ricardo Flores Magón. Ricardo Magón, along with his brothers Enrique and Jesus, was among the most influential figures to create social change in Mexico during the revolutionary movement. In the United States, Magón founded the Partido Liberal Mexicano (Mexican Liberal Party, PLM), dedicated to proletarian social justice, and established chapters across the Southwest. Through their publications in Los Angeles, *Regeneración*, and *Revolución*, Magón downplayed nationalism and emphasized multi-national and ethnic working-class solidarity in the struggle against capitalism. Their view was that Mexicans were leading the way for the liberation of the working class in the United States through their fight against political tyranny and capitalism in Mexico. In Los Angeles, *Regeneración* publicized rallies and labor conferences under the theme of Mexican, Mexican-American, and Anglo-American working class.²

The influence of *Regeneración* echoed in other Mexican expatriated newspapers in the Southwest, such as *La Bandera Roja*, *El Democrata*, *El Liberal*, and others. Some publications, like *El Obrero* (1909), *La Voz de la Mujer* (1907), and *Pluma Roja* (1913-1915), not only articulated the revolutionary cause but also emphasized a greater focus on gender issues and the emancipation of women. For example, after being expelled from Mexico in 1912 by President Francisco Madero, Blanca de Moncaleanos founded *Pluma Roja* in Los Angeles, which positioned women's liberation as central to any social change. The paper's anarchist program called for the full emancipation of women from three oppressors: the state, religion, and capital.

¹Richard Griswold del Castillo, "The Mexican Revolution and the Spanish Language Press in the Borderlands," *Journalism History* 4.2 (Summer 1977), 42, 46.

² *Ibid.*

Moncaleanos was also critical of any man in the revolutionary movement who was not conscious of their suppression of women.³

By the 1930s, the revolution was over, and Magón was dead from circumstantial reasons during his incarceration in an American prison. The Mexican revolutionary press in the Southwest had dwindled or returned to post-revolutionary Mexico. However, the fall of the Diez regime did not mark the end of the Mexican origin press in the United States. Between 1900 and 1930, one million Mexicans crossed the border into the United States. Many of these were war refugees and political exiles from both the Mexican Revolution and the Cristero War that followed. Among them were Mexican conservatives who had been dislodged by the socialist revolution and resettled in the United States. They arrived in the Southwest with resources in hand and opened businesses. The journalists and writers among them established the Mexican exiled press that replaced their pre-revolutionary counterparts. The two major differences between the pre and post-revolutionary expatriated newspapers were that the latter was much more conservative and held a strong sense of nationalism.⁴

In Texas, the Mexican exiled press rejected the internationalist views of *Regeneración* and the ideas of Ricardo Flores Magón in favor of promoting Mexican heritage and championing la raza Mexicana. However, the sense of nationalism differed between publications on a class basis. Newspapers such as the Brownsville based *El Cronista* (1924-1930), El Paso's *La Buena Prensa* (1923), and Houston's *Gaceta Mexicana* (1927-1928), favored the Indianism unleashed by the Mexican Revolution and praised Mexico's Aztec heritage.⁵ They became the backbone of

³ Nocolas Hanellos and Martell Helvetia, *Hispanic Periodicals in the United States, Origins to 1960: A brief History and Comprehensive Bibliography* (Houston: Arte Publico Press, 2000), 24.

⁴ Roberto R. Teviño, "Prensa y Patria: The Spanish-Language Press and the Biculturalization of the Tejano Middle Class, 1920-1940," *Western Historical Quarterly* 4 (November, 1991), 454.

⁵ Teviño, 456.

the immigrant rather than the exile and tailored their message to the rapidly expanding lower-class economic refugees. Though, many of these publications were short-lived. Other publications represented the exiled *inteligencia* from the Mexican upper-class. They represented a version of Mexican nationalism based on European elitism associated with the Porfirio Diaz regime. One of the most prominent of these elitist newspapers (as well as the most successful exile newspaper in Texas) was the San Antonio based *La Prensa* (1913-1959), founded by Ignacio E. Lozano.

La Prensa, like other exiled publications in the borderlands, rejected the internationalist views of *Regeneración* in favor of Mexican nationalism. However, the Mexicanismo that *La Prensa* cultivated was immersed in elitist notions of Spanish cultural heritage. Lozano, who came from an upper-middle-class background in Northern Mexico, steered *La Prensa* to represent the voice of *los ricos*, the elite upper-class Mexican refugees who settled in the Southwest. According to Lozano, *La Prensa* sought to be “absolutely free” of any political faction and reported on both Mexican and international news.⁶

Strategically, Lozano chose to deviate from the conceptual working of the local community press, which served the long standing San Antonio Mexican-American community. Instead, he aimed his publication at a wider Spanish readership throughout the Southwest. Each issue of *La Prensa* was loaded onto freight cars and distributed by rail to other Southwestern cities and border communities in Northern Mexico. *La Prensa* enjoyed wide circulation and peaked at over 32,000 in 1930, well surpassing its competitor *El Imparcial* (1917-1921) max circulation of 9,500.⁷ Riding on the success of his San Antonio paper and hoping to capitalize

⁶ “A la Prensa, a nuestros amigos y al publico,” *La Prensa*, February 13, 1913.

⁷ Onofre di Stefano, “ ‘Venimos a luchar’: A Brief History of la Prensa’s Founding,” *Aztlan* 16 (Numbers 1 and 2, 1987): 105.

on the influx of Mexican immigration to California, Lozano started another publication in Los Angeles called *La Opinion* (1926-present). Lozano's entrepreneurial inclination was correct, and *La Opinion* went on to surpass *La Prensa*, which ceased operation in 1959, and to this day, remains one of the most widely read Spanish-language newspapers in the United States.

However, despite Lozano's nonalignment with political parties, his publication reflected the conservative and anti-revolutionary sentiments of the expelled Mexican elite.⁸ Also, Lozano, like other elitists, believed that by giving more land and rights to the working classes, the revolution had been "the ruin of Mexico, the ruin of industry," and the cause of massive poverty. Through *La Prensa* and *La Opinion*, the Mexican exiled elites played the role of a shadow government. In editorials and articles, they criticized, dictated, and proposed policy for Mexico, while they presented the image of great men in exile and the eventual saviors of Mexico.⁹

The Mexican Exile Press on the Spanish Civil War

During the 1930s, *La Opinion* and *La Prensa*, along with other conservative publications in Mexico, repeatedly criticized the domestic and foreign policies of President Lazaro Cardenas, ranging from agrarian reform to the support of the Spanish Republic.¹⁰ During the Spanish Civil War, Mexico and the Soviet Union were the only countries that supported the democratically elected government of Spain. Along with political and diplomatic support, Mexico supplied the Spanish Republic with \$2,000,000 in aid and material, including small arms and a few aircrafts.¹¹ President Cardenas undertook this action in light of the failure of the Non-Intervention

⁸ Teviño, 455.

⁹ Quoted in Teviño, 456.

¹⁰ "Justificada Protesta," *La Prensa* April 30, 1937.

¹¹ Gabriel Jackson, *The Spanish republic and the Civil War 1931-1939* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), 260.

Committee to prevent the direct flow of arms, supplies, and thousands of soldiers from the German and Italian military to the Spanish Nationalists.¹² However, Mexican society over the Spanish Civil War was divisive. Mexico's working-class and leftwing intellectuals were supportive of the Spanish Republic, while the conservative elite class and the Catholic Church favored the Nationalists.¹³

Pro-Loyalists Mexican workers showed their support through rallies, aid donations, letters of moral support, and military volunteers who traveled to Spain to defend the Republic. Workers unions, such as the *Confederación de Trabajadores de México* (CTM), organized strikes against Mexican businesses that supported Nationalist General Francisco Franco.¹⁴ The Spanish Republic's Ambassador to Mexico, Félix Gordón Ordás, confirmed that Mexico's pro-Republican activists came from, "workers and peasants, intellectuals of the left, members of the PNR... Masons, the Veterans of the Revolution organization, public functionaries supporting President Cardenas's policies, and ... teachers."¹⁵ Mexico's rural population who supported the Republic managed modest efforts but with the deepest sincerity. For example, in the villages of Yztacapa and Teltapa in the state of Hidalgo, residents collected and sent a modest sum of

¹² The Non-Intervention Committee consisted of ambassadors from over two dozen European countries except Switzerland. Important members included France, England, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and the Soviet Union. The committee sought to control the war by barring the sale of arms and supplies to both factions. The United States did not sign the agreement, instead the administration of President Franklin Roosevelt adopted a policy of non-intervention and placed an embargo on Spain. However, Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union intervened in the Spanish Civil War unhindered. See Antony Beevor, *The Battle for Spain: The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939*, (New York: Penguin Books, 2006).

¹³ Mexicans who approved of President Lázaro Cárdenas' effort to aid the Spanish government included those who gravitated toward the nation's two liberal political parties: the *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* (National Revolutionary Party, PNR) and the *Confederación de Trabajadores de México* (Confederation of Mexican Workers party, CMT).

¹⁴ "Huelga Contra Españoles En Mexico," *La Prensa*, November 4, 1936.

¹⁵ Félix Gordón Ordás, *Mi Política Fuera de España* (Mexico: Talleres Graficos Victoria, 1965), 488.

donations, accompanied by a letter offering a “fraternal salute” to the “noble combatants” of the Republic.¹⁶

On the other side of the political divide, Mexican conservative elites attempted to sway public opinion against the Spanish Republic through propaganda. One conservative group, the *Grupo Monterrey* (founded by business leaders in Monterrey), subsidized the distribution of pro-Nationalist and anti-Cardenista propaganda through pamphlets, newspaper articles, and radio broadcasts. Another conservative organization, COPARMEX (Confederacion Patronal de la Republica Mexicana), an employers association, distributed pro-Nationalist pamphlets in factories floors titled: “Communist Atrocities in Spain,” “Bolshevism: Public Enemy Number One,” and “Basic Anti-Communist Manuel.”¹⁷

In Mexico, liberal newspapers expressed their support of the Spanish Loyalists. For example, an editorial from the Mexico City newspaper *El Popular*, argued for the relevance of the conflict in Spain to the Mexican worker, by comparing the conflict with Mexico’s recent history. *El Popular* stated: “In the Spanish latifundium, in the clergy, in capitalism, in the traitorous military rabble, Mexican workers are seeing a repetition of the Mexican Revolution’s experience... The Mexican people are witnessing in the Spanish war their civil war of 1910-1917. Fortunately, during our Revolution, foreign intervention was minimal... Mexican workers are deeply concerned about the fate of the Spanish workers... Triumph of the Spanish Revolution will signify a new manner of struggle and progress for the Ibero-American nations; a step closer for all toward the realization of a better society. Its defeat, however, will be our defeat, through a strengthening of fascism and its threat to the democratic countries.”¹⁸ The

¹⁶ T.G. Powell, *Mexico and the Spanish Civil War* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1981), 125.

¹⁷ Mario Revah, *México y la Guerra Civil Española* (Madrid: Turner Publicaciones, 2004), 250-252.

¹⁸ *El Popular*, July 19, 1938.

Puebla newspaper, *El Diario de Puebla*, praised the Cardenas government efforts in defending the Republicans position to the International Community in the League of Nations by stating “In these chilling moments of international politics, it is well that Mexico persists in pointing out errors and condemning injustices so that the truth historically sustained by this nation endures in the world.”¹⁹

The two most conservative newspapers in Mexico City, *El Excelsior* and *El Universal*, leaned towards the Spanish Nationalist and took opportunities to criticize the Spain Republic on issues concerning Mexican politics at that time. For instance, in late January 1938, *El Universal* published an editorial on the “collectivist failure” of Catalonia’s industrial and agriculture economy. Blaming Catalonia’s failed industrial economy on lower worker wages and time wasted on “useless meetings,” and the failures of Catalonia’s agricultural economy to “the land, belonging to nobody, nobody works it.” The editorial continued by stating, “order and common sense” must prevail over “the empty rhetoric of myopic ideologies and opportunistic agitators” as “a body cannot govern itself without a head.”²⁰ Other conservative newspapers in Mexico, such as *El Provenir* in Monterrey, frequently published pro-Nationalist articles that read: “The Anarchists and the Communist Terror of Red Spain.”²¹ *El Diario de Yucatan* newspaper also treated its readers with similar articles titled: “The Reds are Paying with Their Lives for Their Terrible Crimes.”²² One conservative newspaper in Veracruz, *El Dictamen*, went beyond the usual publication of pro-Franco articles. The owner of the publication, Juan Malpica Silba, was

¹⁹ El Diario de Puebla, October 11, 1937

²⁰ El Universal, January 31, 1938

²¹ El Provenir, January 10, 1938

²² El Diario de Yucatan, November 4, 1939

discovered to have assisted the Italian consul in Veracruz by photographing airplanes headed to the Spanish government.²³

In the United States, the Spanish language press was also divided on the Spanish Civil War. The three most prominent Spanish language newspapers in the East Coast, *La Gaceta* in Tampa, *La Voz*, and *La Prensa* in New York, were pro-Loyalist. During the Spanish Civil War, no other city outmatched New York's material and political support for the Spanish Loyalists. New York housed almost all the headquarters of pro-Loyalist relief aid organizations. The city's two Spanish language daily newspaper, *La Voz* and *La Prensa*, represented the voice of the homogeneous "hispano" community in the city, comprised of Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Spaniards, Mexicans, and other Latin Americans. As we have seen in Chapter 1 of this paper, New York's "hispano" community was decisively pro-Loyalists, and their Spanish language press reflected this and regularly advertised aid drives and fundraising events. In Tampa, the trilingual publication *La Gaceta* represented the voice of the Spanish speaking "Latin" community comprised of working-class immigrants from Cuba, Spain, and Italy. Tampa's Latinos were also devotedly pro-Loyalist. *La Gaceta* regularly published pro-Loyalist articles and advertised community fundraisers to support the Spanish government.

In the Southwest, Lozano's *La Prensa* in San Antonio and *La Opinion* in Los Angeles were the two most prominent Spanish language newspapers. In contrast to the Spanish language press in the Eastern Seaboard, Lozano's publications did not represent the opinion of the working class Mexican immigrant and Mexican-American communities in the Southwest who favored the Spanish Loyalists, see chapter 2. Instead, *La Prensa* and *La Opinion* represented the conservative voice of the Mexican exiled elite. They sided with Mexican conservative

²³ Powell, 142.

newspapers in condemning President Lazaro Cardenas' support of the Spanish government and leaned in favor of the Spanish Nationalists during the Spanish Civil War. Throughout the conflict, Lozano's dual publication reported extensively on the conflict. Consequently, after a few weeks into the war, the short-lived Spanish-language newspaper in San Diego, Texas, *La Voz*, criticized *La Prensa* over their "grandiose" and "extensive" reporting on a conflict "so distant" from the everyday concerns of Tejanos. *La Voz* did not report extensively on the war in Spain during its one year run in 1936; instead, it focused on local and national news from Mexico and the United States.²⁴

However, despite the decision of *La Voz* to ignore the conflict in Europe, the paper did briefly express their opinion on the cause of the conflict. Like other Mexican expatriated newspapers in the Southwest, *La Voz* squarely blamed the Republic for agitating the Nationalist uprising into existence. *La Voz* stated that "the rebellion in Spain...come from the communist proclamations, which have blinded the proletarian class against the bourgeois...the workers searching for an equal utopia by force, does nothing but labor towards their ruin." Other Spanish-language newspapers in the Southwest held a more favorable view of the Loyalist, such as *El Heraldo de Brownsville*. However, no other Spanish-language publication out circulated *La Prensa* and *La Opinion* in the Southwest.²⁵

La Opinion and *La Prensa* were not pro-war publications, and they condemned the foreign intervention on both the Republic and Nationalist side for prolonging the war on several occasions.²⁶ However, the publication's call for peace was often for one that favored the Nationalists. For instance, in September 1936, an editorial in *La Opinion* criticized the Cardenas

²⁴ *La Voz*, July 31, 1936

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ See "Palabras De Paz Y Propositos De Guerra," *La Opinion* January 2, 1937; "Quienes Son Los Mercenarios," *La Opinion*, April 1, 1937.

administration after Mexico rejected the call from the Republic of Uruguay for Pan-American mediation in the Spanish conflict. *La Opinion* stated: “The Mexican Foreign Ministry...considers the mediation of American countries in the Spanish conflict to be an interventionist act and ignores the recent sending of arms [by Mexico] to the government of President Azaña. Consider the humanitarian purpose of ending a bloody civil war to be undue intervention, and refrains from qualifying the ministering of the elements destined to give new impetus to the killing.”²⁷ What *La Opinion* ignored in the editorial is that the major Latin American governments, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru, openly sympathized with the Nationalists, and any mediation that involved these countries would have been skewed towards Franco.

Both publications often criticized the Cardenas administration for supporting the Spanish Loyalist politically and militarily. For instance, in June 1937, an editorial in *La Opinion* compared Great Britain’s response to the Spanish Civil War with that of Mexico. The editorial praised the British government over how they handled the war. *La Opinion* stated when the conflict erupted, the British “put all its sympathies on the side of the government of Don Manuel Azaña. But no more than her sympathy, because she never compromises. Shortly after, when the struggle entered a period of uncertainty, England devised the so-called ‘neutrality pact,’ which allowed it to escape the cordiality that had been dispensing the men of Valencia,” and still maintain favorable relations with Germany and Italy. Meanwhile, *La Opinion* criticized the Cardenas administration's political support for the Spanish Republic, the sale of weapons, and the acceptance of “five hundred children of red soldiers” in Mexico.²⁸ *La Opinion* argued: “Our country has no power to say whether the governments of other countries are legitimate or not.

²⁷ “La No Intervencion Mexicana,” *La Opinion* September 3, 1936.

²⁸ *La Opinion* was referring to roughly 500 refugee children who were popularly known as “Los Niños de Morelia.” They were among the first Spanish Exiles to arrive in Mexico.

The only thing that corresponds is to deal with the constituted governments, leaving the citizens of each country the task of qualifying them.”²⁹

During the conflict, reports of the war by *La Prensa* and *La Opinion* often leaned in favor of the Nationalists. For example, during the Battle of Madrid in November 1936, *La Prensa* reported biased headlines that read: “A Brilliant Maneuver by the Fascists,” and “The Fascists Will Make It More Effective.”³⁰ However, biased reports that favored the Nationalists became more apparent during the bombing of Guernica in April 1937. Between April 27th and 29th, several newspapers across the United States published the harrowing details of the bombing of Guernica by the German Luftwaffe. Frontpage headlines read, “Worst Air Raid of Spanish War,” “Hundreds of Civilians Die In Plane Machine-Gun Fire,” “Historic Basque Town Wiped Out.”³¹ Even though *La Opinion* and *La Prensa* relied on the same war correspondence from the United Press and the Associated Press, like other American newspapers, their reports on the bombing during the same period was more subtle with a greater focus on the Nationalist’s advancements. For example, headlines from *La Opinion* and *La Prensa* read: “Eibar, Captured by Mola: Panic in the city of Bilbao,” “Mola’s Triumphal March: The Basques Abandon their posts,” “The Army of Mola nears Bilbao: The Basques Flee in Disarray.”³² In comparison, *La Prensa* in New York directly focused their reporting on the bombing of civilians. For example, on April 28th

²⁹ “La Toma de Bilbao,” *La Opinion*, June 22, 1937.

³⁰ “Una Brillante Maniobra De Los Fascistas,” *La Prensa*, November 3, 1936.; “Lo Haran Mas Efectivo Los Fascistas,” *La Prensa*, November 6, 1936.

³¹ *The Times* April 27, 1937; *Albany Evening News* April 27, 1937,; *The Times News* April 28, 1937; *The New York Times* April 28, 1937.

³² “Eibar, Captured by Mola: Panic in the city of Bilbao,” *La Opinion* April 27, 1937.; “Mola’s Triumphal March: The Basques Abandon their posts,” *La Opinion*, April 28th 1937.; “The Army of Mola nears Bilbao: The Basques Flee in Disarray,” *La Prensa*, April 28th 1937.

New York's *La Prensa*'s top headline was "Guernica burns; 800 dead: insurgent planes cause horrific ravages."³³

Early reports of the bombing throughout the press were not comprehensive. However, after a few days more became known of the attack, and the American English language press began to print more detailed accounts. For example, three days after the event, the *Los Angeles Times* confirmed that the bombardment was carried out by "German planes and aviators" and published a detailed front-page report with the eye witness accounts, such as the testimony of the Canon of Valladolid, Alberto Onaindia, who rightfully claimed, "the rebels lied when they said they were not responsible for the bombardment." However, Lozano's newspapers did not report significant detail on these revelations. For example, on the same day of the *Los Angeles Times* report, *La Opinion* also reported the death of 800 civilians in an aerial attack "a few days before," on page two. However, the paper's account on the bombing was one sentence long and did not identify who flew the planes or included any eye witness accounts that were already circulating in the press. In contrast, *La Opinion*'s front page reported at greater length the nationalist testimony of events which blamed the bombing on "anarchists," and quoted Franco's invitation to journalists to come and witness the destruction of the "holy city" at the hands of "the red hordes in the service of the criminal President of the Basque Republic."³⁴

Much can be interpreted from *La Opinion* and *La Prensa* over what they reported, but more can be said over what they did not. For example, in California, during the 1930s, Mexican workers played an active role in a variety of pro-Loyalist fundraising activities, see Chapter 2. Yet, *La Opinion* reporting on these events was non-existent. Also, neither publication provided any significant report over American support for the Loyalists in general or the Abraham Lincoln

³³ "Guernica burns; 800 dead: insurgent planes cause horrific ravages." *La Prensa*, April 28, 1937.

³⁴ *Los Angeles Times* April 30, 1937; *La Opinion* April 30, 1937.

Brigade, which the English language press reported extensively. In contrast, the neighboring *Los Angeles Times* reported several stories on American volunteers with headlines reading: “More Americans Killed In Spain,” “Americans Dead in Spain 2,000,” “Americans In Spain Hold Celebration.”³⁵ However, a few articles on Lozano’s editorial page did discuss the internationals in Spain. For example, in April 1937, *La Opinion* published an editorial that discussed international volunteers in Spain but did not provide comprehensive details over the volunteers’ nationalities. In the article, Pablo Santos Lozano, a staff writer for *La Opinion*, labeled many of the internationals as “mercenaries” who fight in Spain for political reasons and only serve to prolong the conflict. However, he did give credit to those who volunteer in Spain over moral principles, but he did not identify who he was describing.³⁶

Lozano was a staunch anti-Communist and frequently published a series of editorials that attacked the ideologies of Socialism, Anarchism, and Communism. One column in *La Prensa’s* editorial page, written by Mexican conservative Enrique Valay, titled, “The Apocalyptic Beast: Communism,” embraced fascism as a defense against Communism. The editorial attempted to absolve Italian Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia and smear the “Bolsheviks” as lying “back-stabbing” murders. Also, Valay claimed: “Fascism is nothing more than a strong and necessary reaction against communism, which will be transferred into a true democracy, with a broader understanding of social and economic problems, fascism will realize the extent of human capabilities, which Marxism will never achieve. Those who reject fascism can be compared to those who, shipwrecked, reject a saving table, waiting for a low.” The editorial went on to attack democracy as well, claiming that “perfect democracy has

³⁵ “More Americans Killed In Spain,” *Los Angeles Times*, October 4, 1937.; “Americans Dead in Spain 2000,” *Los Angeles Times* November 22, 1938.; “Americans in Spain Hold Celebration,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 05, 1937.

³⁶ “Quienes Son Los Mercenarios,” *La Opinion*, April 1, 1937.

never existed, nor will it ever exist, in Mexico, and countries like Mexico, it is nothing more than a bloody farce. Everything is relative, and within that relativity, fascism is the best medicine to cure the World of Bolshevik morbidity.”³⁷

In the same issue of *La Prensa*, Lozano published an editorial written by an unnamed staff writer responding favorably to Benito Mussolini’s call for peace during his speech in Milan on November 1, 1936. *La Prensa* stated: “This postponement of the destructive contest, which Mussolini prioritizes as ‘world peace,’ is imperative at this time.” The piece continued by claiming “the only way to ward off the phantom of destruction,” is through military strength “and spiritually with the intense nationalist propaganda of Fascism—or its equivalent,” against “the advance of communism, and the chaos it brings.”³⁸ The editorial painted Mussolini as a peacemaker and a guardian against Communism, but did not mention Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia or intervention in Spain. In another editorial, *La Opinion* published a flattering column of Adolf Hitler’s accomplishment in creating a “Solid System” of government. Contributor, Paul C. Smith, described Hitler as a man of “great intelligence, acute political perception, inexhaustible energy, who facilitates information he receives and demonstrates a fanatical devotion to his belief in the superiority of the German race.”³⁹

However, despite *La Opinion* and *La Prensa* partiality towards Fascism, the paper did not embrace it completely. For instance, in one editorial *La Prensa* stated: “For us, men of the new world, possessed by an individualistic personality who have torn the breast of our homeland in search of freedom, fascism cannot offer any advantages.” The piece continued by elevating democracy over extremist ideologies, stating “democratic government that, even when imperfect,

³⁷ “La Bestia Apocaliptica: El Comunismo,” *La Prensa*, November 4, 1936.

³⁸ “La Paz De Mussolini,” *La Prensa*, November 4, 1936.

³⁹ “SOLIDO SISTEMA Creado por HITLER,” *La Opinion*, April 27, 1938.

remains in the process of consolidating itself, as the culture of our peoples develops.” *La Prensa* concluded by warning that democratic people should not close their eyes to the danger of fascism, instead we should “understand that fascism in Europe has been a reaction against disorder...that not only threatens to disintegrate nationalities, but also stifles human freedoms.”⁴⁰

Regardless of the publication’s rejection of Fascism, during the Spanish Civil War *La Prensa* and *La Opinion*’s editorial page regularly printed opinion pieces written by fascist sympathizers in Mexico and Nationalist journalists in Spain during the Spanish Civil War. One frequent contributor to the paper’s editorial page was Mexican conservative writer Alfonso Junco. Junco, who regularly wrote religious columns for both publications, was a fervent defender of the Catholic Church and one of Mexico’s staunchest supporter of Francoism and the Spanish Nationalists. Junco was also one of the staunchest critic of President Cardenas acceptance of the Spanish exiles after the war.⁴¹ However, Junco’s writing pales in comparison to another frequent columnist, Falangist writer Manuel Aznar, whose editorials were nothing more than thinly-veiled Nationalist propaganda aimed at persuading public opinion.

Aznar was a Spanish Nationalist journalist and a regular columnist to *La Prensa* and *La Opinion*’s “Spain Today” column, which provided a Spanish perspective on the war. His writings were nothing more than pro-Nationalist propaganda. For example, the day after the bombing of Guernica, Aznar wrote a flattering column about General Franco for *La Opinion*. In the article, Aznar began by asking the question “how many times has General Franco shown us the extraordinary qualities of his military genius?” and proceeded with a long retelling of Franco’s military victories without mentioning the substantial support the Nationalists received

⁴⁰ “El Fascismo en America,” *La Prensa*, November 18, 1937.

⁴¹ Carlos Sola Ayape, “El Escritor Alfonso Junco: El Perfil Ideologico de un Franquista Mexicano,” *En-Claves del Pensamiento* 15 (Enero-Junio, 2014): 171.

from the German and Italian armies.⁴² Two days later in *La Prensa*, Aznar wrote an article aimed at answering the question, which he claimed, “European leftists newspapers,” frequently asked, “what commitments did General Franco make with Mussolini and Hitler, in exchange for the sympathy’s that these two European leaders show towards Spain?” According to Aznar, “neither Italy nor Germany has asked for anything, and, in short, that if something had been requested, incompatible with the freedom, with integrity, with independence and with the dignity of Spain, the dialogue would not even have begun [by Franco].” He continued by attempting to discredit the Nationalists association with “fascism” and instead described the conflict in celestial terms, a fight between the anti-religious “Communists” and the “spiritual” Nationalists.⁴³

Several weeks later, Aznar wrote another column for *La Opinion* titled, “In Spain Democracy is not fighting Fascism.” Aznar claimed that “democracy does not take part in the struggle for Spain: if anything, it would be in the ranks of the Nationalists.” Instead, he described the war as a “fight for the sense of Homeland, Family, Order, Justice, Honor, and Dignity, against denationalization and against all the fears of anarchy.” He also went on to delegitimize democratic governments and stated, “I do not believe that there is in all Spain, neither in the national nor in the red, who seriously dares to chant to us the excellence of a liberal and democratic regime, whose mouth is not seen to be bristling with inevitable catastrophes.”⁴⁴

The Mexican Exiled Press and the Spanish Exiles

During the Great Depression, the United States government's answer to the rise in unemployment was to undertake a massive repatriation campaign aimed at removing non-

⁴² “La España De Hoy: Una Immortal Hour of Generalissimo Franco,” *La Opinion*, April 27, 1937.

⁴³ “La España De Hoy: La Simpatia De Alemania Y De Italia Hacia La España Nacionalista,” *La Prensa*, April 29, 1937.

⁴⁴ “La España De Hoy: En España No Lucha La Democracia Contra El fascismo,” *La Opinion*, June 8, 1937.

citizens from the country. An estimated 400,000 to 600,000 people of Mexican decent were deported between 1929 and 1939. And an estimated 63 percent were birthright citizens.⁴⁵ *La Prensa* and *La Opinion* were among the few publications in the United States to provide comprehensive coverage of the mass deportations of Mexicans. On January 29, 1931, *La Opinion* published an extensive article warning its readers about upcoming round-ups of immigrants and mentioned that lately, “the majority of those deported are Mexican.”⁴⁶ This report was so substantial that the Mexican Consul Rafael de la Colina sent copies of *La Opinion* to the Mexican Consul General in San Francisco, Mexico’s ambassador in Washington, D.C., and Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores in Mexico City along with letter’s detailing the impending raid.⁴⁷

On August 31, 1932, *La Opinion* provided a one year update on the repatriation campaign on their editorial page. The paper rejected the U.S. Department of Labor’s claim that 1,600,000 people were repatriated in 1931 as an exaggeration. Instead, *La Opinion* placed their estimation to be around 250,000, noting that “every day, our countrymen return [to the United States] in increasing numbers.” Also, the paper mentioned that the majority were deported from the borderland states of Texas, California, New Mexico, and Arizona, with smaller numbers from mid-western states.⁴⁸ Though, the paper later reported that Mexican officials estimated that the true number of repatriated might be higher since not all returnees reported to the Mexican immigration offices in border cities.⁴⁹ *La Opinion* also reported on the standard of living and

⁴⁵ Balderrama & Rodriguez, 149-151.; Abraham Hoffman, *Unwanted Mexican Americans in the Great Depression: Repatriation Pressures 1929-1939* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1974), 174.

⁴⁶ “Las Autoridades Locales Piden La Ayuda Federal Para Realizar el Proyecto,” *La Opinion*, January 29, 1931.

⁴⁷ Francisco E. Balderrama and Raymond Rodriguez, *Decade of Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation in the 1930s*, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2006), 72.

⁴⁸ “Cifras Exageradas,” *La Opinion*, August 31, 1932.; “Llegaron A El Paso, Tex 500 Repatriados,” *La Opinion* November 2, 1932.

⁴⁹ “Han Pasado Por Juarez 24,7999 Repatriados,” *La Opinion*, October 31, 1932.

economic condition of Mexicans living in the United States during the Great Depression. The paper mentioned that in 1930, most of the 40,000 immigrants that returned to Mexico did so voluntarily due to “poverty, lack of work or bad treatment.”⁵⁰ They mentioned that among the repatriated, “relatively few returned with some savings.”⁵¹

On May 7, 1934, *La Opinion* exclusively reported that the Mexican government had sent a delegation to the United States to investigate how Mexicans were being repatriated and to examine the living conditions of Mexicans in California, Texas, and Arizona. The article mentioned that the Mexican government ordered the investigation after Los Angeles County officials informed them that 50,000 Mexican migrants were living under difficult circumstances related to the economic depression.⁵² During this time, Los Angeles County appeared to be on the verge of deporting thousands of improvised Mexican immigrants. This spurred the newly inaugurated Cardenas administration to act and initiate government efforts to facilitate the return of the repatriated, which included travel assistance and land distribution.⁵³ *La Opinion* was very critical of the Mexican government's repatriation effort and warned that its “one of those things that must be done well, or not at all,” to ensure that those repatriated do not suffer unnecessary hardships.⁵⁴

The Mexican government's efforts in searching and securing lands for repatriated Mexican nationals coincided with President Cardenas's decision to granted asylum to thousands of Spanish refugees who fled the Spanish Civil War. During the war, the Cardenas

⁵⁰ “40,000 Mexicanos Salieron De Estados Unidos En 1930,” *La Opinion*, March 23, 1931.

⁵¹ “Cifras Exageradas,” *La Opinion*, August 31, 1932.

⁵² “Mexico Investiga Como Se Hacen Las Repatriaciones,” *La Opinion*, May 7, 1934.

⁵³ See Fernando Saul Alanis Enciso, *They Should Stay There: The Story of Mexican Migration and Repatriation During The Great Depression* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2017).

⁵⁴ “Otra Vez la Repatriacion,” *La Opinion*, April 8, 1939.

administration had provided asylum to a few hundred Spanish children and intellectuals.⁵⁵ However, after the defeat of the Spanish Republic in April 1939, well over 350,000 men, women, and children had swelled across the French border into the department of Pyrénées-Orientales, outnumbering the native population by two to one. Overwhelmed, French authorities relocated some of the women and children to whatever shelter they could find before herding the rest with the men to a sandy wasteland along the Mediterranean shore. Surrounded by barb wire, the refugees dug ditches in the sand and constructed primitive tents from tree branches, blankets, and bits of boards from box carts to shelter themselves from the elements in what became known as Argelès-sur-Mer internment camp.⁵⁶

Late in life, world-renowned Spanish cellist and bearer of the United States Presidential Medal of Freedom, Pablo Casals, reflected on his experience after witnessing the horrid conditions in Argelès-sur-Mer in 1939. He described it as a scene from “Dante’s Inferno” with tens of thousands of men, women, and children penned behind barbed wire like “animals.” They lacked shelter, sanitation, medical attention, food, and water. They were confined in the open, exposed to the rain and snow. The deplorable conditions attributed to the “scores [that] had perished from exposure, hunger, and disease.”⁵⁷

Argelès-sur-Mer was just one of several hastily constructed camps that housed the exiles in France. Mexican minister to the League of Nations, Isidro Fabela, was given the task to examine the possibility of providing Mexican aid to the refugees and toured several camps in early February. In his report to President Cardenas, he described the inhuman conditions of Argelès in detail. He cited the lack of sufficient shelter in the face of constant icy “hurricane

⁵⁵ They were known as Los Niños de Morelia and the intellectuals of the Casa de España.

⁵⁶ LIFE July 17, 1939

⁵⁷ Pablo Casals quoted in Albert E. Kahn, *Joys and Sorrows: Reflections by Pablo Casals* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), 223.

wind” from the Mediterranean Sea had contributed to deaths from exposure every night. “The feeding in the fields has been insufficient. The first days only bread was distributed to the newcomers; afterward, but not always, they have been given meat and cereals. But only the healthy, the strong, the young, those who are able to obtain their ration. The weak, the sick, the old, did not always have a way to approach their food and that is why so many died of starvation.”⁵⁸

The number of refugees housed in French custody varied from source to source. Mexican consular official Mauricio Fresco counted 300,000, while Fabela reported over 400,000.⁵⁹ All the same, the avalanche of humanity, which the French had feared would come, had arrived at their southern frontier. Unwillingly becoming host to one of the greatest humanitarian crises of the twentieth century. Fear of extremists led French authorities to confine the exiles in the camps unless they sought to return to Spain or had evidence of being granted asylum from a foreign embassy. In the early weeks of the exodus, several thousand refugees had returned to Spain, lured by Franco’s short-lived policy of reconciliation. However, the letters from family members remaining in Spain received by the exiles, that managed to bypass the censors, reported a different story. One mother wrote to her son in France, “We await your return with joy... try to arrive in time for the First Communion of little Juan.” The warning, hidden from the censor, was obvious to the recipient, for little Juan was an infant. Another wrote, “Come soon. The house is

⁵⁸ Fabela, Isidro, *Cartas al Presidente*, “Carta No. 10,” Febrero 24 de 1939 < http://www.biblioteca.tv/artman2/publish/1939_226/Cartas_al_Presidente_C_rdenas_Carta_10_Los_campos_de_concentraci_n.shtml>

⁵⁹ Mauricio Fresco, *La Emigracion Republicana Espanola* (México D. F: Editores Asociados, 1950), 40. accessed through Biblioteca Virtual Miguel Cervantes archive < <http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra/la-emigracion-republicana-espanola-una-victoria-de-mexico/> > ; Fabela, Isidro, *Cartas al Presidente*, “Carta No. 10,” Febrero 24 de 1939 < http://www.biblioteca.tv/artman2/publish/1939_226/Cartas_al_Presidente_C_rdenas_Carta_10_Los_campos_de_concentraci_n.shtml>

crowded, for the Garcia's lost their home and are living with us. But when you arrive you will find a room with Cousin Jose." Jose was long dead, killed in reprisal after the Asturias uprising in 1934.⁶⁰

Furthermore, Fabela reported a great number of men of considerable prestige who expressed a strong desire to go to Mexico. "I found in Argeles, Arles and Amélie a good number of university students...professors from the Faculties of Philosophy and Law of the Universities of Madrid and Barcelona, doctors, engineers, lawyers who do not want to return to their country....many mechanics, military out of the Academies, aviators, who also wanted to settle in our land as soon as possible, not only because our country has declared that it will open its doors, but because it is the most sympathetic to them from the political point of view." He also mentioned the state of urgency. He pointed out that if the refugees stayed in France much longer, they ran a "very reasonable risk of being handed over to the rebel Franco when France and England recognize him as head of a de jure government."⁶¹

Unbeknownst to Fabela, Cardenas had already secretly offered to accept sixty thousand refugees from the Spanish Republic in 1938, through Mexican Ambassador to Spain, Colonel Adalberto Tejada. The first offer was kept a secret to avoid affecting the morale of the Republican Army still active in combat operations. After the Mexican cabinet favorably received Fabela's report in April, the Mexican government officially announced the acceptance of all refugees in France. Practical reasons motivated Cardenas' decision to grant asylum to the Spanish refugees, but also humanitarian considerations. In his fifth government report speech to congress, Cardenas pointed to the advantages that would benefit Mexico from accepting

⁶⁰ LIFE, July 17, 1939

⁶¹ Fabela, Isidro, Cartas al Presidente, "Carta No. 10," Febrero 24 de 1939 <
http://www.biblioteca.tv/artman2/publish/1939_226/Cartas_al_Presidente_C_rdenas_Carta_10_Los_campos_de_concentraci_n.shtml>

prominent intellectuals, professionals, and experienced laborers. He outlined a plan to disperse the refugees to fluster industrial and agricultural development, Mexico “shall consider utilizing the distribution of the Republican workers of Spain in areas and conditions that favor the national economy.”⁶²

Opposition toward the admittance of Spanish exiles arose immediately after the government announcement. On April 12th, La Union Democratica de Mexico sent Cardenas a message to protest the admittance of more “Iberos.” They argued the arrival of “Spanish Militants” would constitute further problems within the politically divided country.⁶³ The conservative *El Universal* argued that the country did not want extremists, thieves, and political criminals any more than France did. Even pro-Republican supporters during the war were wary of admitting masses of refugees who they feared would include a disproportion amount of extreme leftist, revolutionaries, and communists who would disturb the political balance of Mexico.⁶⁴ The *Excelsior* argued, “The Reds...have the intention of transferring into Mexico the civil war they have lost in Spain.”⁶⁵ The established Spanish community living in Mexico, who had celebrated the Nationalist victory, also reacted negatively against the Republican exiles.⁶⁶ Such a large section of the Mexican press had been hostile towards the Spanish refugees, that journalist and politician Felix Palavicini argued that Franco’s agents must have infiltrated the conservative section of the Mexican press.⁶⁷

⁶² Lázaro Cárdenas en su Quinto Informe de Gobierno el 1 de septiembre de 1939, Latin American Research Resource Project Mexican Presidential Message, <<http://lanic.utexas.edu/larrp/>>

⁶³ El Siglo de Torreon, April 13, 1939.

⁶⁴ Excelsior, June 2, 1939; El Universal May 17-19, 1939.

⁶⁵ Excelsior, January 17, 1939

⁶⁶ Fresco, 29.

⁶⁷ Felix Palavicini, *Mexico; Historia de su Evolucion Constuctiva, IV*, (Mexico: Distribuidora editorial, 1945), 272-73.

In the United States, *La Prensa* and *La Opinion* were also hard critics of President Cardenas' decision to allow admission to thousands of Spanish exiles in Mexico. Both publications attacked the Cardenas administration for welcoming Spaniards at a time when repatriated Mexicans needed assistance. However, like other conservative newspapers, the true intention was to take the opportunity to attack President Cardenas. Also, their argument contradicted earlier statements made concerning Spanish immigrants living in Mexico that sided with the Nationals. For example, a few days after President Cardenas announced he would accept an unlimited number of Spanish refugees, an editorial writer for *La Opinion* and *La Prensa* wrote, "when Mexicans have bread for their children and when the country's citizens abroad are officially supported and repatriated, then the government can afford itself the luxury of helping, on the people's behalf, all the foreign refugees it wished to." The piece also stated that "the best thing" for the refugees should be to "return to their homeland...now that the environment has calmed down." The editorial concluded that this harsh approach might be "selfish, but perfectly human," and "patriotic."⁶⁸

However, this rejection of immigrants was a stark contrast to an earlier argument in November 1936, where *La Prensa* condemned a proposal that called for the expulsion of Spanish nationals residing in Mexico who identified as fascists as "absurd" and "intolerant." *La Prensa* stated: "The majority of Spaniards living in Mexico are laborious, industrious and law-abiding...Many Hispanics have cemented their home among us, creating families that are already Mexican. They have mixed with us in the flesh and the spirit...Being a Spanish supporter of the rebellion is no crime."⁶⁹ In another editorial, *La Prensa* made the same argument towards

⁶⁸ "Primero Los Mexicanos," *La Prensa* April 12, 1939., "Primero Los Mexicanos," *La Opinion* April 10, 1939.

⁶⁹ "Una Iniciativa Absurda," *La Prensa*, November 3, 1936., Mexico's Minister of the Interior estimated that 40,000 of Mexico's 47,000 Spanish residents had sided with the Spanish Falange during the war, and 1,600 were active militants involved in fascist organizations, such as *La Asociación Española Anticomunista y Antijudía*" (The Spanish

protecting pro-Nationalist in the established Spanish community in Mexico, stating the President “is obliged to grant constitutional guarantees to all foreigners, no matter what nationality they hold.”⁷⁰

A few weeks later, after the first contingent of exiles arrived in Veracruz, *La Opinion* and *La Prensa* published an editorial that clarified that the arriving Spanish exiles should not be blamed for being in Mexico. This change of direction was in response to the socialist labor leader Lombardo Toledano’s attempt to redirect anti-Spanish sentiments towards the long-established, and conservative, Spanish community in Mexico. *La Opinion* and *La Prensa* stated, “It was a mistake to bring them into the current circumstance, it would be much worse to withdraw the hospitality granted, no matter how resentful nationalists are, we expect that Mexico will keep her essential principles of decency and honor.” Also, the editorial sympathized with the refugees by comparing them to the Mexican exiles that fled to the United States during the Mexican Revolution. The piece then redirected their criticism towards those who showed preference for the Spanish refugees over Mexican nationals in the United States: Lazaro Cardenas and Narciso Bassols, Mexico’s ambassador to France.⁷¹ Another editorial in *La Opinion* titled “Down with the Mexicans! Long Live the Spanish!” similarly criticized the Cardenas administration for displaying a more favorable attitude toward the Spanish exiles than it did towards the repatriated Mexican nationals. It noted that repatriated Mexicans did not receive the same fanfare that the exiled Spaniards received when they arrived in Mexico.⁷²

Anti-communist and Anti-Jewish Association). See Mario Revah, *México y la Guerra Civil Española* (Madrid: Turner, 2000), 223.

⁷⁰ “Otra Idea Descabellada,” *La Prensa* April 29, 1937

⁷¹ “Consumatum Est,” *La Prensa* June 28, 1939., “Consumatum Est,” *La Opinion* June 29, 1939.

⁷² “Abajo los Mexicanos! ¡Vivan los Españoles,” *La Opinion* June 24, 1936.

In the end, more than 25,000 refugees resettled in Mexico between 1939 and 1942. The German occupation of France severed all diplomatic ties between France and Mexico, ending all efforts to transport the remaining exiles. Instead, thousands were conscripted for forced labor by the Nazi authorities and deported to Germany to work in factories or concentration camps, including 7,000 in Mauthausen.⁷³ As time moved along, the exiles slowly assimilated into Mexican society. Most negative opposition and press coverage gradually cease within the first few years of their arrival. As more and more exiles settled peacefully, animosity against them evaporated.

After the end of the Spanish Civil War, the Mexican exiled press in the United States continued to criticize President Cardenas for having supported the Spanish Republic during the war. They pressed for normalization of diplomacy towards the Franco regime and the rejection of the Spanish Republican government in exile in Mexico City.⁷⁴ After the outbreak of World War II and the United States' entrance into the war after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, *La Prensa* and *La Opinion*'s redirected their attention towards the threat of global war. Anti-Communist and anti-Socialist editorial continued to be published. However, they no longer presented Hitler and Mussolini in any positive light. Instead, they focused on the Allied war effort against the Axis powers. On domestic issues, *La Prensa* and *La Opinion* continued to report on matters concerning the Mexican American community during the 1940s, including the Zoot Suit Riots and Mexican-Americans fighting in World War II.

⁷³ Gilbert Martin, *The Routledge Atlas of the Holocaust* (Routledge: Abingdon, 2009), 224.

⁷⁴ "La Bandera Español," *La Opinion* April 6, 1939.

Archive Collections and Libraries Consulted

Ateneo Español de México

Biblioteca Digital Memorial De Madrid

Biblioteca Nacional De España Hemeroteca Digital

Biblioteca Virtual Miguel De Cervantes

Biblioteca Garay

California State University Oviatt Library

Google News Archive

International Longshore and Warehouse Union Library and Archives

Library of Congress Chronicling America Historic American Newspapers

Historical Jewish Press Project Archives

Marxist Internet Archive

Newspapers.com

New York University Tamiment Library Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archive Collection

Readex Hispanic American Newspapers, 1808-1980.

Southern Methodist University Fondren Library

The University of South Florida Tampa Library's Spanish Civil War Oral History Project and the Spanish Civil War History Project

University of Washington University Library Pacific Northwest Historical Documents